Abstract
Humans are organized in societies, a phenomenon that would never have been possible without the evolution of cooperative behavior. Several mechanisms that foster this evolution have been unraveled over the years, with population structure as a prominent promoter of cooperation. Modern networks of exchange and cooperation are, however, becoming increasingly volatile, and less and less based on long-term stable structure. Here, we address how this change of paradigm affects the evolution of cooperation. We discuss analytical and numerical models in which individuals can break social ties and create new ones. Interactions are modeled as two-player dilemmas of cooperation. Once a link between two individuals has formed, the productivity of this link is evaluated. Links can be broken off at different rates. This individual capacity of forming new links or severing inconvenient ones can effectively change the nature of the game. We address random formation of new links and local linking rules as well as different individual capacities to maintain social interactions. We conclude by discussing how adaptive social networks can become an important step towards more realistic models of cultural dynamics.
Introduction
From human societies to the simplest biological systems, cooperative interactions thrive at all levels of organization. A cooperative act typically involves a cost (c) to the provider while conferring a benefit (b) to the recipient (with b > c) [Hamilton (1996) ; Trivers (1985) ; Wilson (1975) ; Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) ]. Individuals try to maximize their own resources and are therefore expected to avoid paying any costs while gladly accepting all the benefits offered by others. This ubiquitous paradox is often analyzed in the framework of (evolutionary) game theory. Game theory describes systems in which the success of an individual depends on the action of others. The classical approach focused on the determination of optimal strategic behavior of rational individuals in such a static setting [von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) ]. Evolutionary game theory places this framework into a dynamical context by looking at the evolutionary dynamics in populations of players [Maynard Smith (1982) ]. The expected payoff from the game is a function of the frequencies of all strategies. Successful behaviors spread in such a population. There are two interpretations of evolutionary game theory: In the conventional setting, the payoff is interpreted as biological fitness. Individuals reproduce proportional to their fitness and successful strategies spread by genetic reproduction. A second interpretation is the basis for cultural evolution in social systems: Successful behaviors are imitated with a higher probability. They spread by social learning instead of genetic reproduction. Both frameworks are captured by the same mathematical approach: The generic mathematical description of evolutionary game dynamics is the replicator equation [Taylor and Jonker (1978) ; Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) ; Zeeman (1980) ]. This system of nonlinear ordinary differential equations describes how the relative abundances (frequencies) of strategies change over time.
The assumption underlying the replicator equation is that individuals meet each other at random in infinitely large, well-mixed populations. But it also emerges in other cases, e.g. if the interaction rates between individuals are not random [Taylor and Nowak (2006) ] or from a largepopulation approximation of evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations [Traulsen et al. (2005) ].
However, in reality the probability to interact with someone else is not the same across a population or social community. Interactions occur on social networks which define the underlying topology of such cooperation dynamics. Initially, this line of research has focused on regular lattices [Nowak and May (1992) ; Herz (1994) ; Lindgren and Nordahl (1994) ; Szabó and Tőke (1998); Hauert (2002) ]. More recently, more complex topologies and general networks have been considered in great detail [Vainstein and Arenzon (2001) ; Abramson and Kuperman (2001); Ebel and Bornholdt (2002a) ; Holme et al. (2003) ; Szabó and Vukov (2004) ; Santos and Pacheco (2005) ; Ohtsuki et al. (2006) ; Santos et al. (2006b Santos et al. ( , 2008 ]. While the theoretical advances in this field are tremendous, there is so far a lack of experimental data. Designing and implementing such experiments has proven difficult and, so far, only general statements as "the probability to be generous is correlated with the number of social links of an individual" can be made [Branas-Garza et al. (2007) ].
One important property of social networks that is seldom addressed in theoretical studies is that real world social networks are not static. Instead, we make new friends and lose touch with old ones, depending on the kind of interaction we have with them. This makes social networks an example of an adaptive network [Gross and Blasius (2008) ]. The basic idea is that interactions which benefit both partners last longer than interactions where one partner is exploited by the other. Here, we discuss such an approach, which leads to analytical results in certain limits. These serve as important starting points for further developments.
Active linking: Random link formation
We break down the model into two parts: Evolutionary dynamics of strategies (or behaviors) of the individuals associated with nodes in a network whose links describe social interactions. The adaptive nature of the social interactions leads to a network linking dynamics. We consider two-player games of cooperation in which individuals can choose to give help to the opponent (to cooperate, C), or to refuse to do so (to defect, D). The network is of constant size with N nodes. The number of links, however, is not constant and changes over time. There are N C individuals that cooperate and N D = N − N C individuals that defect.
Linking dynamics
An interaction between two players occurs if there is a link between these players. Links are formed at certain rates and have specific life-times. We denote by X(t) the number of CC links at time t. Similarly, Y (t) and Z(t) are the number of CD and DD links at time t. The maximum possible number of CC, CD and DD links is given by 
γ, the network is almost complete, which recovers the results for well-mixed populations. For α 2 γ, the network is sparse with few links. The most interesting case we discuss below is α 2 ≈ γ, where the system has fixed points with intermediate ranges of X, Y and Z. Rescaling α and γ in an appropriate way (note that the equation contains squares of α and linear terms of γ) does not change the fixed points of the system, but affects the overall timescale of active linking. When this process is coupled with strategy dynamics, such changes can be crucial.
While the above is probably the simplest possibility to model linking dynamics, more sophisticated choices are possible, taking for example the number of existing links of a node into account. However, to address some general properties of the coevolution between links and strategies, we concentrate on the simplest choice first. In the steady state, the number of links of the three different types is given by
Here, φ CC , φ CD , and φ DD are the fractions of active CC, CD and DD links in the steady states. Examples of population structures attained under steady-state dynamics for three different combinations of (N C , N D ) are shown in Fig.1 .1. 
Strategy dynamics
Next, we address the dynamics of the strategies at the nodes. We consider the stochastic dynamics of a finite population, i.e. we restrict ourselves to finite networks. We consider general two-player games of cooperation given by the payoff matrix
Thus, a cooperator interacting with another cooperator obtains the reward from mutual cooperation R. Cooperating against a defector leads to the sucker's payoff S, whereas the defector obtains the temptation to defect T in such an interaction. Finally, defectors receive the punishment P from interactions with other defectors. A social dilemma arises when individuals are tempted to defect, although mutual cooperation would be the social optimum (R > P ). We distinguish three generic cases of 2-player games of cooperation:
• Dominance: When T > R > P > S, we enter the realm of the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) [Rapoport and Chammah (1965) ], where cooperation is dominated by defection. The opposite scenario, when R > T and S > P , poses no social dilemma and is referred to as a Harmony Game (HG) [Posch et al. (1999) ].
• Coordination: R > T and S < P leads to what is called coordination or Stag Hunt games (SH) [Skyrms (2003) ], in which it is always good to follow the strategy of the majority in the population. Except for R + S = T + P , one strategy has a larger basin of attraction. This strategy is called a risk dominant strategy. For R + S > T + P , cooperation is risk dominant.
• Coexistence: In the case of R < T and S > P , known as a HawkDove [Maynard Smith (1982) ] or Snowdrift game (SG) [Sugden (1986) ; Doebeli and Hauert (2005) ; Hauert and Doebeli (2004) ], a small minority is favored. This means that the ultimate outcome in a population of players is a mixture of strategies C and D.
From the payoff matrix, we can calculate the payoffs of the individuals, depending on the number of interactions they have with cooperators and defectors. On a complete network, the payoffs are
Often, the payoffs are scaled by 1/(N − 1), such that the payoffs do not increase with the population size. For the strategy update process defined below, this corresponds simply to a rescaling of the intensity of selection, i.e. changing the noise intensity, if all individuals have the same number of interactions. If the number of interactions is not the same for all players, the heterogeneity between players can lead to new effects [Santos et al. (2006b) ; Santos and Pacheco (2006) ].
For strategy dynamics, we adopt the pairwise comparison rule [Szabó and Tőke (1998) ; Blume (1993) ], which has been recently shown to provide a convenient framework of game dynamics at all intensities of selection [Traulsen et al. (2007 [Traulsen et al. ( , 2006 ]. According to this rule, two individuals from the population, A and B are randomly selected for update (only the selection of mixed pairs can change the composition of the population). The strategy of A will replace that of B with a probability given by the Fermi function (from statistical physics)
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The reverse will happen with probability 1 − p. The quantity β, which in physics corresponds to an inverse temperature, controls the intensity of selection. For β 1, we can expand the Fermi function in a Taylor series and recover weak selection, which can be viewed as a high temperature expansion of the dynamics [Nowak et al. (2004) ; Traulsen et al. (2007) ]. For β 1, the intensity of selection is high. In the limit β → ∞, the Fermi function reduces to a step function [Traulsen et al. (2006 [Traulsen et al. ( , 2007 ]: In this case the individual with the lower payoff will adopt the strategy of the other individual regardless of the payoff difference.
The quantity of interest in finite population dynamics is the fixation probability ρ, which is the probability that a single mutant individual of one type takes over a resident population with N − 1 individuals of another type.
Separation of timescales
The system of coevolving strategies and links is characterized by two timescales: One describing the linking dynamics (τ a ), the second one describing strategy dynamics (τ e ). We can obtain analytical results in two limits, where both timescales are separated. Defining the ratio W = τ e /τ a , separation of time scales will occur for W 1 and W 1.
Fast strategy dynamics
If strategies change fast compared to changes of the network structure, active linking does not affect strategy dynamics. Thus, the dynamics is identical to the evolutionary game dynamics on a fixed network. Such systems have been tackled by many authors for a long time [Nowak and May (1992) ; Herz (1994) ; Lindgren and Nordahl (1994) ; Szabó and Tőke (1998) (2006b, 2008) ]. The difficulty of an analytical solution for such systems is determined by the topology of the network, which corresponds to an initial condition in our case. Analytical solutions are feasible only for few topologies. One important limiting case leading to analytical solutions are complete networks corresponding to well-mixed systems. In this case, the fixation probability can be approximated by
where erf(x) is the error function and
). If strategy dynamics is fast, the linking dynamics only becomes relevant in states where the system can no longer evolve from strategy dynamics alone, but changing the topology allows to escape from these states.
Fast linking dynamics
Whenever W 1 linking dynamics is fast enough to ensure that the network will reach a steady state before the next strategy update takes place. At the steady state of the linking dynamics, the average payoffs of C and D individuals are given by
Note that the effective number of interactions of cooperators and defectors can become very different if φ CC φ DD or vice versa. Comparing Eqs. (1.8) and (1.9) to Eqs. (1.4) and (1.5) suggests that the linking dynamics introduces a simple transformation of the payoff matrix. We can study standard evolutionary game dynamics using the modified payoff matrix
Consequently, linking dynamics can change the nature of the game ]. So far, we have only shown this in the limit where linking dynamics is much faster than strategy dynamics (W 1). However, the result is expected to hold even when the two time scales are comparable (see below and also Refs. [Pacheco et al. (2006b,a) 
]).
In general, all generic transformations are possible, as illustrated in Figure 1 .2. The transition points can be determined as follows: Strategy C is a Nash equilibrium for R > T . This property changes to R < T when Fig. 1 .2 When linking dynamics occurs much faster than strategy dynamics, the nature of the game being played changes. The arrows indicate the conditions under which a game located at the arrow start is transformed into a game located at the arrow end.
For example, φ CD can be increased by reducing the death rate of CD links, γ CD . With increasing φ CD , the condition is fulfilled at some point. At the transition point, C is either transformed into a Nash equilibrium or loses this property. An equivalent transition for D is given by the condition
However, the conditions are not entirely independent, since at least two parameters have to be varied. Usually, it is enough to vary the three linkdeath rates γ and fix the link-birth rates α to observe these transitions. It is also worth mentioning that, in coordination games, the transformation can change risk dominance.
Comparable timescales
As we have shown, active linking can lead to a wide range of scenarios that effectively change the character of the game. However, the analytical results have been obtained assuming time scale separation. Fig. 1.3 shows the results of numerical simulations for a gradual change of the time scale ratio. Deviations from the analytical predictions are limited to a single order of magnitude. In other words, the time scale separation is not a very strong assumption and remains valid for a much wider range of parameters than expected. Even for moderate active linking, our analytical results are recovered. Thus, self-organising network structures and the evolutionary game dynamics on the network are intimately entangled. Having identified the relevance of time scale separation in a minimal model of linking dynamics, we now turn to more complex linking dynamics based on local rules.
Individual based linking dynamics: Local link formation
In the model discussed in Section 1.3, we have a fluctuating number of links and analytical results in the two limits where the time scale of linking dynamics and strategy dynamics are well separated, allowing for the meanfield treatment considered. We now introduce an alternative description in which the number of links is conserved, but in which decision to maintain or rewire a link results both from individual preference in the choice of partners and negotiation between individuals linked [Santos et al. (2006a) ]. Such an individual based decision making cannot be dealt with at a meanfield level and calls for a numerical implementation.
Specification of the linking dynamics
To reduce the number of parameters, let us start by restricting the space of possible games by fixing R = 1 and P = 0, while −1 ≤ S ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ T ≤ 2.
This spans the four dynamical outcomes introduced before: a) HG (S > 0 and T < 1); b) SG (S > 0 and T > 1); c) SH (S < 0 and T < 1) and d) PD (S < 0 and T > 1) (see Section 1.3.2).
Because S ≤ 1 and T ≥ 0, the payoff against a cooperator is always higher than the payoff against a defector, cf. Eq. 1.13. Thus, interacting with a cooperator is always the best possible option. Consequently, every individual will be satisfied when connected to a C and dissatisfied otherwise. Keeping the total number of links constant, all individuals are now able to decide, on an equal footing, those ties that they want to maintain and those they want to change. The co-evolution between strategy and network structure is therefore shaped by individual preferences towards interacting with one of the two strategies [Santos et al. (2006a) ]. Figure 1 .4 illustrates the process. If A is satisfied, she will decide to maintain the link. If dissatisfied, then she may compete with B to rewire the link (see Fig.  1 .4), rewiring being attempted to a random neighbor of B. Thus, the loser in a competition for a link loses an interaction. This paves the way for the evolution of a degree-heterogeneous network. The intuition behind this reasoning relies on the fact that agents, equipped with limited knowledge and scope, look for new social ties by proxy [Kossinets and Watts (2006) ]. Such a procedure can only be treated numerically and does no longer lead to a simple rescaling of a payoff matrix as the mechanism discussed in Section 1.3. On the other hand, it introduces some features characteristic of realistic social networks.
The fact that all individuals naturally seek to establish links with cooperating individuals, creates possible conflicts of interests as illustrated in Fig. 1.4 . For instance, B is satisfied, because she can profit from A. Ob- . On the other hand, A is unsatisfied with this situation (S < 1). Therefore, A wants to change the link whereas B does not. The action taken is contingent on the fitness π A and π B of A and B, respectively. With probability p (see Eq. 1.6), A redirects the link to a random neighbor of B. With probability 1−p, A stays linked to B. Finally, if both players are dissatisfied, the same methodology is used to decide who keeps the connection.
viously, A is not satisfied and would prefer to seek for another cooperator. Decision is contingent on the payoff π A and π B of A and B, respectively. With the probability p = [1 + e −β[π A −π B ] ] −1 (also used in the strategy update, cf. Eq. 1.6), A redirects the link to a random neighbor of B. With probability 1−p, A stays linked to B. Whenever both A and B are satisfied nothing happens. When both A and B are unsatisfied, rewiring takes place such that the new link keeps attached to A with probability p and attached to B with probability 1 − p. Thus, the more successful individual keeps the link with higher probability.
Numerical results
As previously, this model establishes a coupling between individual strategy dynamics and population structure dynamics. This leads necessarily to a time scale associated with strategy evolution, τ e and a second associated with structure evolution, τ a . When the ratio W = τ e /τ a approaches 0, the network dynamics is irrelevant and we recover the fast strategy dynamics of Section 1.3.3.1. On the other hand, with increasing W , individuals become apt to adapt their ties and form a degree-heterogeneous network with increasing efficiency.
The contour plots in Fig. 1 .5 illustrate the final fraction of cooperators Final frequency of cooperators in all games for different time-scale ratios between strategy and structure dynamics. Results for the fraction of successful evolutionary runs ending in 100% of individuals with strategy C for different values of the time scale ratio W , starting from 50% of each strategy. We study the four different games in the area 2 ≥ T ≥ 0 and 1 ≥ S ≥ −1: HG, SG, SH and PD (see Section 1.3.2). For W = 0 (N = 10 3 , z = 30 and β = 0.005), the results fit the predictions from well-mixed populations, although individuals only interact with a small subset of the population. With increasing W (faster structure dynamics), the rate at which individuals readjust their ties increases, and so does the viability of cooperators. Above a critical value W critical ∼ 4.0 (see also Fig. 1.6 ), cooperators efficiently wipe out defectors. For the strategy evolution dynamics adopted here (pairwise comparison, see Section 1.3.2), and according to [Ohtsuki et al. (2006) ], cooperators would never be favored in static networks.
for different values of the ratio W in networks with average connectivity z = 30 (this value reflects the mean value of the average connectivities reported in [Dorogotsev and Mendes (2003) ] for socials networks). We plot the fraction of cooperators who survive evolution, averaged over 100 independent realizations for the same values of the game payoff entries (T, S) and the time scale ratio W . For W = 0 the results reproduce, as expected [Santos et al. (2006b) ], the predictions for finite, well-mixed populations. Yet, with increasing W , cooperators gain an advantage, as they can terminate their undesirable interactions with defectors. Rewiring changes the strategy dynamics and paves the way for a radically distinct evolutionary outcome in which cooperators are now able to dominate for the entire range of games. Under structural dynamics, cooperators can cut their links to defectors, which gives them an advantage compared to the situation on a static network. The swifter the response of individuals to the nature of their ties, the easier it gets for cooperators to wipe out defectors. Note further that cooperators already dominate defectors for W = 4, corresponding to a situation far from the time-scale separation conditions defined in Section 1.3.3. Additional insight is provided in Fig. 1 .6 (left panel), where we show how cooperation dominates defection as a function of W when T = 2 and S = −1 (lower right corner of the panels in Fig. 1.5) , which represents the most challenging case for cooperators. Different values of the average connectivity z are shown. For small W , cooperators have no chance. Their fate changes as W approaches a critical value W critical -which increases monotonically with connectivity z -cooperators wiping out defectors above W critical (the increase of W critical with z is expected, since there are more links to be rewired; in practice, W critical is determined as the value of W at which the frequency of cooperators crosses 50%). Thus, the evolutionary outcome and effective game at stake relies on the capacity of individuals to adjust to adverse ties. Fig. 1 .6 also provides evidence of the detailed interplay between strategy and structure. On one hand, strategy updating promotes a local assortment of strategies, since Cs breed Cs and Ds breed Ds. On the other hand, under structural updating, one is promoting local assortative interactions between cooperators (that is, CC-links) and disassortative interactions between defectors and cooperators (that is, CD-links), which constitute favorable steps from an individual point of view. Clearly, when simultaneously active, strategy update will reinforce assortativity among Cs, but will inhibit disassortativity between Ds and Cs, which overall will promote the dominance of cooperation over defection.
Graph structures under individual based linking dynamics
For any W > 0, individual choices lead to heterogeneous graphs in which some individuals interact more and more often than others. The overall onset of increase of heterogeneity qualitatively follows the wave of cooperation dominance shown in Fig. 1 .5 [Santos et al. (2006a) ]. In fact, the overall heterogeneity of the graph increases as W increases reaching a maximum at W critical , above which heterogeneity decreases again down to a stationary value determined by neutral dynamics in a system with one strategy only [Santos et al. (2006a) ]. The results shown suggest that the adaptive dynamics of social ties introduced here coupled with social dilemmas accounts for the heterogeneities observed in realistic social networks [Amaral et al. (2000) ].
Local linking with individual linking time scales
In the two previous models, the linking dynamics proceeds population-wide at the same speed, determined by W . This implies that all individuals are assumed to react in the same way to adverse social ties. It is commonly observed, however, that different individuals respond differently to the same situation [Rubin (2002) ; Ridley (2003) ; Buchan et al. (2002) ] -some have the tendency to swiftly change partner, whereas others remain connected even though they are dissatisfied with their partners' behavior. Extending the linking dynamics introduced in the previous section allows us to The different colors indicate the three possible outcomes of the rewiring competition between the two individuals. First, as each individual competes for the link with probability given by her parameter σ, A and B compete both with probability σ A σ B (indicated by the hatched zones). In this case, decision is determined by the payoff-dependent probability p (see Eq. 1.6). Second, when only one of the individuals competes (indicated by the gray zones), this individual takes a unilateral decision. In total, A's preference prevails with probability
Finally, the white zone indicates the situation in which both individuals refuse to compete, such that the link remains unchanged.
represent this kind of behavioral diversity.
Specification of the linking dynamics
We adopt the same parameterization of 2 × 2 games as in Section 1.4 and fix the difference between mutual cooperation and mutual defection to 1, making R = 1 and P = 0. We focus on the PD in which S < 0 and T > 1, i.e. when defection is expected to dominate, although the model could easily be applied to SH and SG games as well. Since S ≤ 1 and T ≥ 0, every individual prefers interacting with cooperators to interacting with defectors. Consequently, everyone attempts to maintain links with cooperators, but change links with defectors. However, unlike before, individuals are now not necessarily equally willing to engage in these conflicts. We represent their eagerness to do so by introducing an individual characteristic σ ∈ [0, 1]. Individuals with lower values of σ will be more resilient to change, and hence can also be viewed as more loyal towards their interaction partners. In this way, the behavior of each individual is uniquely defined by two parameters: the game strategy (C or D) and the topological strategy (σ). Note that these quantities are both transferred during strategy update. Thus, both aspects of a players strategy are subject to evolution and change over time. Fig. 1 .7 illustrates how σ influences the rewiring decisions. Consider two connected individuals A and B, whose topological strategies are given by σ A and σ B . A potential conflict about the link arises as soon as at least one of the individuals is dissatisfied about the interaction. If this is the case, both A and B decide independently of each other whether they will compete for the link or not. Each individual competes with probability given by her topological strategy σ. As such, σ A and σ B define three possible outcomes for the competition over the link between A and B. First, both A and B compete for the link with probability σ A σ B . The individuals' payoffs π A and π B ultimately dictate the winner of this conflict. The decision of A prevails with probability
, the decision of B with probability 1−p. If decision is to redirect the link, the new partner is chosen randomly from the immediate neighbors of the former partner. Second, A competes while B does not with probability σ A [1 − σ B ]. In this case, A decides the fate of the link unilaterally. Similarly, when B competes but A does not (this happens with probability σ B [1 − σ A ]), B decides the fate of the link unilaterally.
Hence, both individuals have the opportunity for a unilateral decision. Taken together, A's decision prevails with probability q A = σ A σ B p+σ A [1− σ B ] and B's decision with probability
Finally, the link remains untouched with probability (1 − σ A )(1 − σ B ), since no individual competes for the link. This last possibility encompasses the situation in which the social tie is maintained despite, e.g. mutual dissatisfaction. Overall, σ introduces a simple means to study the evolution of each individual's willingness to sever adverse ties. On the one hand, when all individuals have σ = 0, no links are rewired, reducing the population to a static society. On the other hand, when σ is maximal (= 1), the limits investigated in the previous section are recovered.
Numerical results
We start by associating the topological strategy σ of an individual with her strategy in the game. This means that individuals with the same game strategy will also have the same topological strategy. In the active linking model of Section 1.3, this is also included, as we assume that the propensity to form links and the lifetime of links is determined by the strategies.
When Ds are less eager to change partner (σ D = 0.5 and σ D = 0.0) than Cs (σ C = 1.0), cooperators ensure the stability of favorable interactions while avoiding adverse ones more swiftly. This makes local assortment of Cs more effective, enhancing the feasibility of Cs' survival, as shown in Fraction of cooperators 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Fig. 1.8 The effect of a strategy-dependent willingness to change σ on the final frequency of cooperators. Results show the fraction of evolutionary runs ending in 100% of cooperating individuals, starting from 50% of each strategy, and this in relation to the game parameter T . The other game parameter S is chosen such that T + S = 1 is satisfied, bringing us into the realm of the PD. The situation in which all individuals are equally willing to react to adverse ties (σ C = σ D = 1.0) serves as a baseline. Reducing σ D makes it easier for Cs to wipe out Ds. Reducing σ C , on the other hand, has the opposite effect (W = 2.5, N = 10 3 , z = 30, β = 0.005). The rewiring of links, no matter which ones, creates heterogeneous networks that are known to provide cooperators with an environment in which they may acquire an advantage over defectors. Thus, even when cooperators are resilient to change, their behavior prospers at the expense of defectors' greed.
From these results, one might expect that swift reaction to adverse social ties will evolve when σ is considered as an evolutionary trait. This intuition does, however, not always hold. We start each evolutionary run by selecting each individual's σ from a uniform distribution. We analyze the distribution of σ at the end of the evolutionary process, when the population reaches fixation (i. e., all individuals adopt the same game strategy). The lines in Fig. 1 .9 correspond to the cumulative distribution C(σ) of σ (C(σ 0 ) being defined as the fraction of individuals with σ > σ 0 ) for both C (solid lines) and D individuals (dashed lines). The initial distributions of σ lead to the black diagonal line; the final distributions are shown for different values of the game parameter T . In the regime where cooperators dominate (T < 1.8), the incentive to change is low since many social ties rely on mutual satisfaction. Hence, the distribution of σ over all individuals hardly changes. For higher values of T (1.8 ≤ T ≤ 2.1) a transition occurs from cooperator dominance to defector dominance. Competition becomes fierce and it pays to respond swiftly to adverse ties, as evidenced by an increase of C(σ) in Fig. 1.9 . Ds are, however, subject to a much stronger pressure to change their links than Cs, since they can never establish social ties under mutual agreement. Thus, only Ds with high σ survive. As a consequence, defectors end up to react promptly to adverse ties, whereas cooperators will always be rather resilient to change. For even larger values of T (> 2.1), defection dominates and evolutionary competition of linking dynamics fades away. As a result, the incentive to increase swiftness reduces, a feature which is indeed reflected in the behavior of C(σ).
Discussion
Our analysis has been limited to one-shot games. In other words, individuals interact once during the lifetime of a link as if they have never met before. But in repeated interactions, more possibilities exist. If I only take into account your behavior in the last interaction, there are already 2 2 = 4 strategies. Since the number of strategies grows rapidly with memory [Lindgren (1991) ; Ebel and Bornholdt (2002b) ], one often considers so called trigger strategies in which individuals keep their behavior unchanged until they are faced with an unsatisfactory partner for the first time. Such strategies can be implemented into our active linking framework, assuming that individuals act repeatedly as long as a link between them is present. This procedure leads to analytical results for evolutionary stability under active linking even in the context of repeated games ].
Other studies have shown numerically that network dynamics can significantly help dominated strategies. Even if only the dominant strategy can locally affect the network structure, this can help the dominated strategy under certain linking rules that put restrictions on mutual interactions of the dominant strategy ; ; Biely et al. (2007) ]. A recent study for growing networks has shown that the defectors in the PD have an advantage as long as a network is growing by preferential attachment. Once network growth is stopped, the cooperator strategy increases in frequency [Poncela et al. (2008) ].
To sum up, by equipping individuals with the capacity to control the number, nature and duration of their interactions with others, we introduce an adaptive network dynamics. This leads to surprising and diverse new game dynamics and realistic social structures. We have presented approaches of how to implement network dynamics. The first one, active linking, allows to define differential equations for the numbers of links, which leads to analytical results. The second approach, individual based linking dynamics, is implemented numerically and leads to network features of empirical social networks. Both cases provide a clear and insightful mes-sage: co-evolution of population structure with individual strategy provides an efficient mechanism for the evolution of cooperation in one-shot dilemmas. Moreover, if the willingness to sever undesirable connections is also regarded as part of the individual strategy, the same principles provide an evolutionary basis for the decision of adjusting social ties. For example, in the PD cooperators evolve to maintain their interactions. But defectors are forced to seek new partners frequently, because long term relationships with defectors are undesirable.
The consideration of adaptive social networks is an important step towards more realistic models of social interactions in structured populations. Coupling the dynamics on networks with the dynamics of networks leads to emergent new phenomena outside the classical considerations of social dynamics on static networks.
